In the fictional book Animal Farm, the pigs started with the best of intentions, but the love of power and corrupting influence of privilege gradually changed them until they were indistinguishable from the tyrannical rulers they had initially rebelled against[1]. The president of Uganda, after ascending to power in 1986, made a statement that made him Africa’s favourite at the time. He said the problem with Africa is that leaders have a habit of staying in power for a long time. This statement alone reflects how the entire plot of Animal Farm is based. The intentions are pure until they are in charge, and suddenly, they become their predecessors. The pigs begin with noble ideas only to become what they once despised, this shows how swiftly power corrupts even those who start with the best intentions.

My essay, therefore, shall look at the background before the 2005 amendment that removed presidential term limits under article 105(2) of the republic of Uganda, the political history of unstable Uganda and how the age limit was a tactical move to keep the president in power. In the case of Paul Ssemwogerere vs Attorney General, the constitutional court upheld the amendment following the fact that parliament has the power to amend law. Although critics say it lacks human constitutional principles, it was legal and within the law. Likewise, the debate around presidential term limits in Africa[2], and specifically Uganda, exemplifies the tension between those who seek reform and those who use constitutional processes to strengthen their political dominance. Term limits were initially introduced to curb the excessive power of African presidents, but over time, these constitutional safeguards have often been manipulated to ensure prolonged presidencies. This paradox has caused widespread concern and debate on the role of constitutional amendments in Africa[3].

Post-independence

You see, when Uganda gained independence in 1962, it inherited institutions that were meant to pave the way for stable governance. Contrary to that, the new nation attracted coups, violence and prolonged conflict and the new strong man politics. [4] By the time YK Museveni came to power, the country was in a shabby and terrible state, and some came forward to say how his government was the “better bad government” [5]by comparison to what the country had endured. But then, why did the author call it ‘better bad’ and not good? The answer is simply in the age limits and militarism in presidentialism[6]. The constitution comes forward to settle these and break the cycle and to lay the foundation for the ideal good leadership[7] by putting forth a leadership renewal.

However, these constitutional provisions have proven vulnerable to manipulation. In 2005, the removal of presidential term limits [8]was justified by claims of political continuity and the will of the electorate. Over time, this amendment set the stage for the eventual removal of the age limit in 2017, which further centralised executive authority in the hands of President Yoweri Museveni.

Historically, African countries have experienced political instability due to the power struggles and authoritarian rule of their leaders. The long reigns of figures like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sékou Touré in Guinea, and Idi Amin in Uganda have shaped the region’s political landscape. Many African nations have seen the rise of authoritarian regimes that were bolstered by manipulated or amended constitutions, often to remove term limits and enable leaders to stay in power indefinitely[9].

One of the significant political developments in Africa in the 1990s was the introduction of term limits to combat the culture of presidents' overstaying in power. These reforms were seen as a way to protect democracy and promote political stability by preventing any single individual from monopolising power for extended periods. The rise of term limits was hailed as an essential step towards democratic consolidation.

However, despite the initial positive reception, many African leaders soon began to see term limits as an obstacle to their prolonged rule. In countries like Uganda, the move to lift term limits became a priority for political elites seeking to maintain control. Thus, constitutional amendments to remove term limits became a common strategy to extend the stay of authoritarian leaders[10].

The Rise of Term Limit Manipulations

In Uganda, the conversation surrounding term limits began as early as 2003. The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) convened a National Conference at Kyankwanzi, a political training institute, where the issue of lifting term limits came to the forefront. Initially, the amendment of term limits was not on the official agenda of the meeting, but it soon became a central issue. The amendment of 105(2) to lift presidential term limits was approved by the NRM’s National Executive Council (NEC) and submitted to the Constitutional Review Commission[11].

This shift was marked by significant internal resistance within the ruling party. Many high-ranking members of the NRM, including former ministers and political veterans, expressed dissent against the proposed amendment. These individuals, including figures like Eriya Kategaya, Jaberi Bidandi Ssali, and Miria Matembe, resisted the amendment because it was a betrayal of Uganda’s democratic journey. Kategaya, in particular, argued that the provision of presidential term limits was meant to prevent a return to Uganda’s history of violent power struggles and military coups. The push to remove term limits, according to these dissenters, risked undoing the progress Uganda had made toward democratisation and peace[12].

Kategaya’s argument was rooted in Uganda’s turbulent political history, which had seen power change hands through violence and military coups, such as those in 1971, 1979, and 1985. He believed that the 1995 Constitution was a direct response to this history, and limiting presidential terms was a critical mechanism for avoiding further political instability.

The Dynamics of Pro-Amendment and Anti-Amendment Groups

The debate over the constitutional amendment in Uganda reflected a wider ideological division. On one side were the pro-amendment groups, who argued that removing the term limits was a necessary step for ensuring continuity and stability, especially in the face of evolving political dynamics. These proponents, including members of the NRM and their allies, believed that term limits were an impediment to the effective governance of the country and that a strong leader, like President Museveni, should not be constrained by a fixed tenure.

On the other side were the anti-amendment groups, which included civil society organisations, opposition political parties, and veterans of the liberation struggle. These groups saw the amendment as a direct threat to the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution and an affront to the ideals of political renewal and succession. They argued that lifting term limits would pave the way for dictatorship, as it would allow President Museveni to rule indefinitely, undermining Uganda’s democratic gains.[13]

 Manipulation of Democratic Institutions to Facilitate Term Limit Lifting

The process of amending the Ugandan Constitution to lift presidential term limits was characterised by the manipulation of democratic institutions, including Parliament and the judiciary. In Uganda, the ruling party used its majority in Parliament to push through the amendment, often bypassing dissenting voices and suppressing opposition. This reflected a broader trend in Africa, where constitutional amendments are facilitated through institutional manipulation, often involving the bribing or coercion of lawmakers.

In addition to parliamentary votes, other methods of manipulating constitutional processes have been observed across the continent. For example, in countries like Rwanda and Burundi, leaders have relied on judicial interpretations or referenda to legitimise the removal of term limits. In Rwanda, a manipulative referendum was held to approve a change to the term limit provision, which was seen by many as a coercive tactic to secure President Kagame’s continued rule.

In Uganda, the term limit amendment was justified as a constitutional necessity, but critics saw it as a deliberate attempt to consolidate power in the hands of the president and entrench authoritarian rule. The decision to remove term limits was framed as a choice made by the people and their representatives, but it was clear that the process was heavily influenced by political elites with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.

The Broader Impact of Term Limit Removal on Uganda’s Democracy

The removal of term limits in Uganda has had significant implications for the country’s democratic processes. While the government argues that it allows political stability and continuity, critics contend that it undermines the principles of democracy by concentrating too much power in the hands of one individual. The absence of term limits has led to concerns about the erosion of democratic norms, such as free and fair elections, political accountability, and the peaceful transfer of power.

Furthermore, the manipulation of constitutional amendments to suit the political interests of the ruling party has undermined public trust in democratic institutions. The widespread use of state resources to support the amendment process and suppress opposition voices has created a political climate where dissent is stifled and political opposition is marginalised.

Conclusion:

While constitutional amendments may be necessary to address evolving political realities, they must be carried out with the full participation of the people and by democratic principles. The case of Uganda and other African nations demonstrates that the manipulation of constitutional processes to remove term limits undermines the foundations of democracy. To ensure the long-term stability and democratic governance of African nations, it is essential to strengthen institutions such as civil society, the judiciary, and Parliament. Moreover, citizen engagement and participation in the political process must be prioritised to ensure that constitutional reforms are in line with the will of the people rather than the interests of a few entrenched political elites.

Therefore, the attempts to amend presidential term limits, particularly in Uganda, have had far-reaching consequences, often leading to further instability. The 2005 amendment in Uganda set the stage for the continued erosion of the constitution, driven by personal political desires or Western influence[14]. The courts, which should serve as a safeguard, have been unreliable, as many judiciaries in one-party dominant states are influenced by political control. Armstrong’s analysis highlights key factors, including presidential popularity, weak opposition, and corruption, which enable leaders to hold on to power.

The situation in Uganda reflects a broader issue in Africa, where the constitutional provisions limiting presidential terms often fail to protect democracy. Simply having a constitution is not enough; there must be a culture of constitutionalism, with citizens actively defending their rights. The ongoing corruption and patronage systems in African politics further undermine democratic progress. A shift is needed, empowering the populace and strengthening civil society to hold leaders accountable.

An independent judiciary, free from political influence, is also critical in upholding constitutional rights. Additionally, a strong and organised opposition is essential to counteract efforts to amend the constitution for selfish purposes. With these changes, Africa can move towards a future where term limits and democracy are respected, and political power is more accountable to the people.

Africa found itself beset by the strange paradox of strong presidents sitting atop weak States—states that routinely lacked the requisite institutional capacities and resources to fulfil even their most basic foundation[15].

‘…after ten years in power, one was a veteran; after 15, you are an elder; at 20, you are nearly extinct, and at 20+, you have become a liability…. The history of those leaders who have been in power for over 15 years has largely been a history of diminishing marginal returns (DMRs). In other words, the longer in office, the more disastrous their performance. Correspondingly, the situation of their countries grows worse… By contrast, for all those African countries (without exception) that have introduced term limits…there has been progressive democratic (and economic) reform. By removing term limits, Uganda joined the ignominious company of a country like Chad, which despite its large oil reserves, is in both political and economic trouble[16]. Oloka OJ.

Books

1. Kanyeihamba, G.W., 2002. Constitutional and Political History of Uganda.

2. Oloka-Onyango, J., 2017. Controlling Consent: Uganda’s 2016 Elections.

3. Cheeseman, N., 2019. Should I Stay or Should I Go: Term-limits, Elections, and Political Change in Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia. In: Batter, A. and Elsie, R., eds. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4. Darboe, F., 2018. A Critical Analysis of Presidential Term Limits in Africa: A Mixed-Methods Case Study of Causes of Political Violence in Burundi. Doctoral dissertation, Nova Southeastern University.

5. Tripp, A.M., The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda. Available at: USIP.

1. Omotola, J.S., 2011. Third-Term Politics and the De-Institutionalization of Power in Africa. Africa Review, 3(2), pp.123-139.

2. Riedl, R.B., 2014. The Advantages – and Drawbacks – of Presidential Term Limits as a Tool for Building Democracy in Africa.

3. Tangri, R. and Mwenda, A.M., 2010. President Museveni and the Politics of Presidential Tenure in Uganda. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28(1), pp.31-49.

4. Segawa, N., 2016. Ugandans Debate Term Limits As Election Approaches. Global Press Journal. Available at: Global Press Journal.

5. The New Vision, 2006. Oloka Responds to the President on Term Limits. 31 July. Available at: New Vision.

Book Chapters

1. Tusasirwe, B., 2006. Political Succession in Uganda: Threats and Opportunities. In: Peter, C.M. and Kopsieker, F., eds. Political Succession in East Africa: In Search for a Limited Leadership. Kituo Cha Katiba and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

2. Mabasi, T. and Kasimbazi, E., 2013. The Implications of the “No Term / Third Term” Politics to Democracy and Constitutionalism in Africa: A Case Study of Uganda.

Reports and Other References

1. Afrobarometer, 2020. Most Ugandans Want Presidential Term and Age Limits Reinstated.

2. Library of Congress, 2017. Uganda Bill Eliminating Presidential Age Limit and Extending.

3. Armstrong, B., 2011. Pressures and Presidential Term Limits. Available at: Northwestern University.

Legal Cases and Constitutional References

1. Paul Ssemwogerere and Zachary Olum v Attorney General, Constitutional Court of Uganda.

2. The 1995 Constitution of Uganda (Articles 105(2) and 102).

3. Coalition for Constitutional Amendment, a platform created by NGOs to oppose the lifting of presidential term limits in Uganda.

[1] George Orwell, Animal Farm 1945

[2] J.Shola Omotola, ‘Third-Term Politics and the De-Institutionalization of Power in Africa,’ Africa Review 3, 2, 2011: 123-139, at 124

[3] 2 Rachel Beatty Riedl, ‘The Advantages—and Drawbacks—of Presidential Term Limits as a Tool for Building Democracy in Africa,’ March, 2014 in ???

[4] Matfess, H., 2015. Rwanda and Ethiopia: developmental authoritarianism and the new politics of African strong men. African Studies Review, 58(2), pp.181-204.

[5] https://www.thecritiquemagazine.com/post/a-better-bad-government

[6] Hutchful, E., 1997. Militarism and problems of democratic transition. The Hard Road Ahead, CO: Lynne Rienner.

[7] Foday Darboe, 2018 at 37.

[8] Versteeg, M., Horley, T., Meng, A., Guim, M. and Guirguis, M., 2020. The law and politics of presidential term limit evasion. Colum. L. Rev., 120, p.173.

[9]  5 Nic Cheeseman, ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go: Term-limits, elections, and political change in Kenya, Uganda and Zambia’, June 2019, in Baturo, Alexander, and Robert Elgie, eds. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits.

Oxford University Press, 2019 [10] Foday Darboe, ‘A Critical Analysis of Presidential Term Limits in Africa: A Mixed-Methods Case Study of Causes of Political Violence in Burundi,’ 2018 at 31. Doctoral dissertation. Nova Southeastern University.

Retrieved from NSUWorks, College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences – Department of Conflict Resolution Studies. Accessible at https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd/108 (Accessed on 1/06/2020).

[11] Cheeseman, 2019 at 25. The Presidential term was eventually restored to 5 years by the X Constitutional Court of Uganda.

[12] Eriasa Mukiibi Sserunjogi, ‘Ten years later: Revisiting term limits drama of 2005 - Part I,’ The Daily Monitor, 11/July/2015.

[13]   Nakisanze Segawa, ‘Ugandans Debate Team Limits As Election Approaches,’ Global Press Journal, 2016. Accessible at https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/uganda/ugandans-debate-term-limits-election-approaches/ (Accessed on 6/07/2020).

[14] Armstrong, 2011 at 9. Pressures and Presidential Term Limits. Accessible at https://polisci.northwestern.edu/documents/undergraduate/ben-armstrong.pdf.

[15]Prempeh, 2008 at 111 as cited in Nic Cheeseman at 42.

[16]The New Vision, ‘Oloka responds to the President on term limits,’ 31st/ July/2006. Accessible at https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1143715/oloka-responds-president-term-limits

FEATURE IMAGE CREDIT: Geo News